Hilo sesudo de economí­a polí­tica, anarquismo y empresarios hijosdeputa

[Sarri]

Danuto, al oftalmólogo, que has visto "empresario" y te has cegado. Más.

Pero si era para Garvey.

"Pero la verdad es que llevo dos dí­as preocupada, lo primero, por mi salud. Algo pasa, defensas bajas, otitis, garganta, creo que tuve algo de fiebre (una pupa), stress, cuerpo femenino, no sé si será hormonal, pero no estoy bien, me siento muy muy cansada, como si acabara de correr una maratón, me duele el oí­do, los ovarios, etc etc, y esto de saber qué narices tengo es lento, pero estoy en ello."

Oftalmólogo no sé yo, que me operé los óculos hace un año.

Que quiere decir cuerpo femenino?¿, es una enfermedad nueva?¿, es contagiosa?¿

Viene a ser un eufemismo para no decir que sangra por tol coño.

[Amazonia]

No, no solo esto es lo que queria decir, pero...

[Kamarada Garvey]

Me han recetado una mierda de la buena. Ciprofloxacino. El Augmentine de los de antes debe ser que era speed del malo, del que te venden en el casco viejo de Bilbao, y esto debe ser caballo blanco. O que como estoy en Valencia tienden más al éxtasis-extano. Y ya cuando lees el prospecto y los efectos secundarios te cagas. Voy a estar 7 dí­as volando.

[javi]

Samuelson y las pensiones

http://www.elcorreo.com/bizkaia/sociedad/201410/12/samuelson-pensiones-20141010134914.html

El premio Nobel estadounidense explicó hace más de 30 años cómo la generación del 'baby boom' hubiera podido ayudar a sus hijos consumiendo menos e invirtiendo "en más y mejores fábricas"

    Javier Muñoz - batallitas



"El Congreso elevó el año pasado las cotizaciones sobre salarios, creyéndolo necesario para situar a la Seguridad Social en una base financiera solvente. En este momento hay una fuerte tendencia a reducir esos aumentos con el objeto de aliviar la carga que pesa sobre empresas y trabajadores".

No es un artí­culo de actualidad. Así­ empieza la columna publicada el 17 de abril de 1978 en la revista 'Newsweek' por el premio Nobel de Economí­a Paul Samuelson (1915-2009), autor del manual de economí­a que se ha estudiado en las facultades durante décadas . Hablaba del futuro de las pensiones en Estados Unidos e indicaba que las discusiones sobre el fondo de reserva, la hucha donde la Seguridad Social guarda el remanente de las épocas de elevada actividad económica, sin dejar de ser una cuestión importante, no es lo fundamental del debate sobre las jubilaciones.

"El problema básico -subrayó Samuelson hace 36 años- es que el sistema, a finales de este siglo y principios del próximo, tendrá que mantener a mucha más gente mayor, que necesitará pensiones, compensaciones por incapacidad y cuidados médicos". Llegado ese momento, continuaba, habí­a que ver cuántos trabajadores estarí­an cotizando para mantener a los retirados.

El Nobel estadounidense dibujaba un futuro que es noticia en 2014. Y no parece que se hayan hecho muchas cosas desde entonces. En 1978 se barruntaban las dificultades que tendrí­a la generación del 'baby boom' para cobrar sus pensiones. Un riesgo que, según Paul Samuelson, se habrí­a conjurado si esa generación hubiese seguido el "ejemplo" de la anterior: formar familias a edades tempranas y criar más hijos de los necesarios para completar la tasa de reposición.
Lo Más

Pero la sociedad caminaba en la dirección contraria. Si a mediados de los setenta por cada estadounidense mayor de 65 años habí­a otros seis laboralmente activos, en 2024 estaban previstos cuatro. "A medida que aumenta el número de esposas que sólo tienen un primer hijo de los veinte a los treinta años, habrá más parejas que acaben teniendo menos hijos de los que en principio se habí­an propuesto tener", auguró Samuelson.

En ese escenario -más mujeres en el mercado laboral y familias más pequeñas- era lógico que los economistas debatieran si convení­a o no subir los impuestos para sostener la Seguridad Social. Dado que en el futuro habrí­a menos hijos y nietos trabajando para mantener a más abuelos longevos, parecí­a obvio que las cotizaciones de los primeros no cubrirí­an todas las necesidades. El dinero que faltara deberí­a de salir de alguna parte.

Podrí­a salir del aumento de la presión fiscal, pongamos por caso. Esa alternativa le parecí­a a Samuelson como hacer gimnasia para estar en forma cuando llegaran los problemas demográficos. Y razonó lo siguiente: "Los economistas se dan cuenta, si reflexionan, de que la generación de 1978 podrí­a ayudar a la del año 2018 consumiendo hoy menos, a fin de que inviertan más recursos en la estructuración de una formación de capital que proporcione en el 2018 más y mejores fábricas y equipamiento más avanzado, y una productividad laboral lo más alta posible a fin de poder mantener a los viejos de 2018".

Respecto a consumir menos, hay que tener en cuenta que en la década de los setenta del siglo pasado no preocupaban la caí­da de la demanda y la deflación, que es lo que inquieta hoy en Europa, sino la inflación elevada unida al estancamiento económico. En aquel tiempo, Samuelson pensaba que una menor demanda podrí­a permitir a la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos bajar los tipos de interés, pero no para alimentar burbujas financieras, sino inversiones productivas. Un dilema que se repite en la actualidad.

Lo esencial de ese argumento, al margen de la coyuntura económica, era que el dinero podí­a desplazarse desde "las industrias del consumo" a la "formación de capital". De esa forma, indicaba Samuelson, "habremos empezado sin duda en esta generación a ayudar a la siguiente". Un conclusión que parece escrita hoy.

[Lacenaire]

El tema generacional permanece intocado, e intocable. En EEUU se manifiesta a través de la hiperburbuja universitaria. En España con el estallido de la hiperburbuja inmobiliaria y la losa crediticia. Y para largo visto el percal.

[Putas y barcos]

La Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos [deberí­a] bajar los tipos de interés, pero no para alimentar burbujas financieras, sino inversiones productivas.

Pues necesitan un estado socialista en eeuu rapidito, porque las inversiones productivas yanquis que no sean para software, audiovisual o frikadas de defensa que luego tumban los rusos con dos tontadas, las demás van todas a Asia, vamos a China, para abreviar. Por ahí­ van mal en eeuu y casi que en la ue, sino fuera porque los franceses y los alemanes son especialistas en inventarse regulaciones para que al final solo las cumplan los de casa... a dios gracias.

[javi]

necesitaban, que el texto es del año 78...

[Putas y barcos]

necesitaban, que el texto es del año 78...

Exacto, que en el 78 tení­an una economí­a productiva del copón, igual era el 40% de la producción industrial del mundo... pero ahora, ¡ahora!, ahora en estados unidos de norteamerica que no son ni mexico ni canada, ahora te pagan (superpower = maquina de imprimir dolares) por leer el puto NYT en tu pc y no dar mucho la brasa con mejorar el seguro...

[javi]

Exacto, que en el 78 tení­an una economí­a productiva del copón, igual era el 40% de la producción industrial del mundo... pero ahora, ¡ahora!, ahora en estados unidos de norteamerica que no son ni mexico ni canada, ahora te pagan (superpower = maquina de imprimir dolares) por leer el puto NYT en tu pc y no dar mucho la brasa con mejorar el seguro...

si sustituimos NYT por prensa nacional/regional, ¡soy americano!

[Lacenaire]

http://crashoil.blogspot.com.es/2014/09/programa-para-una-gran-transformacion.html

[Putas y barcos]

Exacto, que en el 78 tení­an una economí­a productiva del copón, igual era el 40% de la producción industrial del mundo... pero ahora, ¡ahora!, ahora en estados unidos de norteamerica que no son ni mexico ni canada, ahora te pagan (superpower = maquina de imprimir dolares) por leer el puto NYT en tu pc y no dar mucho la brasa con mejorar el seguro...

si sustituimos NYT por prensa nacional/regional, ¡soy americano!

quita, quita, que hueles a analista estratégico de rollos de economí­a/industria a costas de los fueros vascos (osea, que lo pague otro) que tiras para atrás... esto es, ud. es un hombre honrado que hace una labor necesaria para que esten informados los funcionarios de nivel A colocados por el PNV y así­ conseguir ser un ente eterno y trascendente (con alguna entrada eventual outsiderspañolaza, por ventilar la habitación)...
...que lo que yo digo es que Homer Simpson y su pollo automática para apretar el botón es una forma de vida REAL para la clase media americana guayona desde el boom de las .com en eeuu... ¿como es sostenible eso?... PORQUE TENGO LOS MISILES

Y sino curras en SENER en su sección de Inteligencia Estratégica.. buen sitio.

[Putas y barcos]

...
Y sino curras en SENER en su sección de Inteligencia Estratégica.. buen sitio.

En estos momentos, SENER y ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems están construyendo este nuevo sistema AIP cuyo diseño se adapta muy bien a las especificaciones de los submarinos más modernos con alta demanda de energí­a AIP.

La alternatriva Merkel a Abengoa, los rusos de Técnicas Reunidas y la puta que parió a Pableke...

http://www.sener-aerospace.com/News/sener-participa-en-conferencia-sobre-hidrogeno-ehec-2014
Javi el Basko, sospechoso habitual.

[Yehuda]

4:20 sicherheit geht vor, la seguridad va delante, es lo primero

4:25

U fí¼nf und zwanzig

-atención, tripulación del U25 

[problemaS]

Esa alternativa le parecí­a a Samuelson como hacer gimnasia para estar en forma cuando llegaran los problemas demográficos.

Pero que grande soy, si es precisamente lo que estoy haciendo yo!!!!!!!!!!!!!! bueno, gimnasio y bicicleta, pero ya se entiende.

[javi]

Ravi Menon: Seeking decent returns in an era of sub-par growth

Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Sovereign Investor Institute Government Funds Roundtable, Singapore, 6 November 2014.

http://www.bis.org/review/r141114e.htm

The global conjuncture

The major economies of the world are at an inflection point.

In the US, the era of quantitative easing has come to an end. Next year, for the first time in eight years, we are likely to see a hike in the Fed funds rate.

    The good news is that monetary policy normalisation will occur in the context of a strengthening US economy.
    The bad news is that for financial markets conditioned by persistently easy monetary conditions over the last six years, there is considerable uncertainty over the pace and extent of interest rate normalisation.
    The Federal Reserve has done as best as it can in communicating its approach through forward guidance. But there is many a slip between cup and lip that could to lead to disorderly market adjustments.

In the Eurozone, there is tension between restoring public debt to a sustainable trajectory and supporting a faltering economy.

    The ECB has committed to expand the size of its balance sheet by increasing asset purchases, while an active debate rages in Brussels on the appropriate balance between reducing fiscal deficits and supporting growth.

In Japan, the impact of the first arrow of monetary stimulus is at risk of being blunted by the recent consumption tax hike.

    The Bank of Japan has just announced a further expansion in stimulus - an open-ended asset purchase at a rate of about 15% of GDP a year until the inflation target of 2% is met.
    Meanwhile, the third arrow remains largely in its quiver.

In China, the challenge is to strike a delicate balance between implementing the reforms necessary for long-term sustainability while supporting short-term growth and stabilising the property market.

    The reform agenda that emerged out of the Third Plenum offers a credible and comprehensive blueprint for the way forward.
    The leadership is keenly aware of what needs to be done and is committed.
     But significant execution risks remain.

In India, there is a new government in place committed to improving the business environment for investment and building the infrastructure necessary for a strong manufacturing sector.

    But India needs to accomplish this while taming inflation and reducing its fiscal deficit, not to mention recalibrating the dynamic between the centre and the states that is critical for reforms to take root.

Reverting to mean or different this time?

The weak and uneven global recovery post-Crisis has raised concerns about the pace of future economic growth and what it means for returns on investments. Despite ultra-accommodative monetary policy, most advanced economies have not attained so-called escape velocity.

    The legacies of the financial crisis - in the form of debt overhangs - continue to exert a drag.
    The structural deficiencies in the major economies, such as under-investment, cast a dark cloud on future potential growth.

But one thing that ultra-low interest rates over the past six years have clearly done is to depress returns, particularly in fixed income assets.

    US bond returns since 2009 has averaged 2.3% p.a. compared to returns of 5.8% p.a. over the past 20 years.

This has contributed to a more challenging investing environment for government funds - namely pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and central banks - many of which have significant allocations to developed market fixed income instruments.

Mean reversion is a key tenet of investment theory - the expectation is that as interest rates normalise, returns should revert to pre-crisis levels. But the cliché that this time is different could well be true. Secular trends weigh on future economic growth, and consequently the real return on investment.
Drivers of future economic growth

What are the prospects for future economic growth? There are, in my view, four key drivers of long-term growth: deleveraging, demographics, productivity, and energy. Let me elaborate on each of them.

First, deleveraging. Global balance sheets need to undergo significant adjustments. This is a structural issue that will take time to address.

    For about 20 years preceding the Global Financial Crisis, there had been a significant build-up of debt in the advanced economies.
    This period - often called the Great Moderation - could just as well have been called the Great Leveraging.

Household debt grew rapidly in the US and Europe after 2000, driven by low interest rates and compression in risk spreads. It has come down a little since the Crisis, more so in the US than in Europe, but has still some way to go in both economies.

But what little private sector deleveraging has occurred has been offset by public sector re-leveraging. In the aftermath of the Crisis, public sector debt has ballooned as a result of financial sector bailouts and the effects of automatic fiscal stabilisers as economic growth decelerated.

    Government gross debt in the US and Eurozone increased from about two-thirds of GDP in 2007 to about 100% this year

At the same time, leverage ratios have risen sharply in some emerging market economies in recent years as borrowers took advantage of the abnormally low interest rate environment.

    Total debt in emerging market economies rose from 115% of GDP in 2008 to 150% of GDP in 2013.

Thus, rather than falling, debt-to-GDP at the global level has continued to rise.

    Global total debt (excluding the financial sector) rose by 38 percentage points between 2008 and last year, to reach some 212% of global GDP.
    Only the financial sector has undergone substantial deleveraging to-date.

Essentially, the process of deleveraging remains incomplete. The world as a whole has lived beyond its means. It must now work off these past excesses. The gradual unwinding of the debt build-up in both the private and public sectors will have a dampening effect on economic growth in the advanced economies for several years.

The second driver of growth is demographics. Slowing population growth and rapid ageing are the most daunting headwinds buffeting the global economy over the next 10-20 years. In fact, demographic trends will negatively impact virtually all of the world's major economies, both advanced and emerging.

    In the US, UK, and France, annualised labour force growth will be barely positive over the next two decades.
    In Japan and Germany, the labour force is expected to shrink, subtracting from GDP growth.
    The most dramatic decline will be in China. Labour force contribution to GDP growth will swing from a positive 1.5 percentage points over the last 20 years to virtually zero over the next 20 years, with much of the decline occurring in the immediate future.

But demographic decline is not universal. Many emerging market economies - India and South-east Asia, for example - will continue to have favourable demographics that will support growth.

Demographics is not destiny. This brings us to the third driver of growth - productivity. Human ingenuity to coax higher production out of scarce resources has overcome past demographic challenges. This can be achieved either through more intensive use of existing technology or through breakthroughs in new technology. But there is considerable uncertainty about the prognosis for productivity growth.

On the pessimistic side of the debate is the notion of technological stasis.

    Robert Gordon has presented the most well-known articulation of this view.
    The thesis is that most of the truly important innovations (such as the steam engine, electricity, and modern sanitation) have already been fully utilised, while newer inventions (for example, digital technology) do not seem to have as much transformative impact.
     It is not that there is a dearth of innovations today - on the contrary, there are many. It is just that they have not had as much impact on productivity as earlier innovations.

Techno-optimists, however, believe that we are on the cusp of a new wave of technological breakthroughs that will greatly raise the economy's productive capacity.

    The story of genomics, robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing is only starting to unfold.

Moreover, the world does not comprise of the advanced economies alone. Regardless of what happens to technological advances at the frontier, emerging market economies have considerable scope to raise productivity by simply catching up to the existing state of play at the frontier.

Given their low levels of productivity relative to the frontier (as represented by US productivity), emerging market economies have enormous scope to raise productivity through capital deepening and adoption of existing technology and modern production methods.

    In China, for instance, despite substantial gains in the last two decades, the productivity level is only about 15% that of the US.
    In Indonesia and the Philippines, it is only about 10% that in the US
    With the right policies, these economies can sustain good rates of productivity growth for a few more decades.

A fourth factor impacting long-term economic growth is energy. Some of the world's largest economies - the US, Japan, China, and India - are also among the largest net importers of oil. Cheaper and more plentiful energy is akin to a supply-side boost to these economies.

    The shale gas revolution in the US has markedly reduced its dependence on energy imports and helped to boost industrial competitiveness as energy costs stabilise at a lower level.
    It would be unwise to extrapolate too much from the recent fall in oil prices of over 25% (between July and October this year). But a gentle secular decline in the real price of oil is not an unrealistic assumption that, if true, should be a boon to global economic growth.

To sum up the impact of the four key drivers of growth, deleveraging and demographics are quite unambiguously a dampener while energy appears a benign force. The long term trend for productivity is hard to predict. But even assuming a generally optimistic prognosis for productivity, it is quite likely that global growth in the next 20 years is likely to be lower than in the last 20. This means that returns from financial investments are also likely to be lower in the next 20 than in the last 20.
Safeguarding long-term returns

The modest outlook for long-term economic growth presents a major challenge for government funds to close the widening gap between their financing needs and investment returns.

    On the liabilities side, population ageing in the advanced economies will increase pension claims and place a heavier burden on social services such as healthcare.
    On the assets side, slowing global economic growth will constrain investment returns.

There are three ways to narrow this mismatch between trends in assets and liabilities:

    The first is to reduce financing needs by lowering social expenditures or increasing fiscal revenues. Both are politically difficult to do.
    The second is to reach for yield by taking on various combinations of higher leverage, longer duration, and greater credit and liquidity risks. But the public perception and character of government funds limit their scope for aggressive risk-taking.
    The third way is to expand the investment portfolio to include new asset classes and new geographies for consistent and uncorrelated return streams. This option, while not easy, probably offers the best way forward.

Consider new asset classes. Many government funds are increasing their allocation to non-traditional assets such as real estate, infrastructure, and even private equity.

    Australian and Canadian pension funds have been pioneers in infrastructure investing, from as early as the 1990s.
    Norway's Government Pension Fund Global plans to increase its real estate investments to as much as 5% of its assets, with a corresponding decrease in its bond holdings.
    CalPers has been increasing its allocation to private equity and real assets, including real estate and infrastructure.

Next, new geographies. Over the last 20 years, government funds have steadily reduced their home bias in their equity holdings, investing in markets outside their own country. The big shift in portfolio allocation in recent years has been to emerging markets. If long-term growth prospects for emerging markets are superior to advanced economies, it seems to make sense to increase the strategic allocation to these markets, beyond what is dictated by market capitalisation.

The challenge is in finding ways to translate the superior growth performance of emerging market economies into asset returns, given the limited depth of their capital markets. One way is to perhaps invest in advanced economy corporates with significant exposure and presence in emerging markets.

    Market research shows that equity investments in certain advanced economy companies with significant emerging market exposure can indeed enhance portfolio performance.

Local presence to serve global interests

Even so, there is no substitute for direct investment in emerging market assets. But to understand the performance and risk characteristics of each market requires access to specialist knowledge of political systems, macroeconomic trends, currency conditions, and regulatory and legal frameworks in these countries.

Singapore offers a compelling value proposition for government funds seeking a vantage point from which to build knowledge, insights, and partnerships in Emerging Asia. As a premier asset management centre, Singapore offers global funds a gateway to investing in Asia.

Asset managers are drawn to Singapore's strong global and regional links and their growing presence reinforces these links and at the same time enhances the larger financial eco-system of banks, insurance companies, and the supporting networks of legal, accounting, and technological expertise.

The growth in assets under management has in turn helped to draw in more sell-side products, including traditional and alternative assets like real estate and private equity, as well as a wide range of capabilities.

Several government funds have set up offices in Singapore to support their research and investments in Asia. They include:

    ICPRC;
    Norges Bank Investment Management;
     the Swiss National Bank; and
    La Caisse de dépí´t et placement du Québec.

Conclusion

Managing money for the long-term is one of the most difficult of human endeavours. For those of us who manage government funds, we also owe a duty of care and responsibility to future generations - to sustain decent returns at an acceptable level of risk in an era of sub-par growth.

A wise man once said, "In investing money, the amount of interest you want should depend on whether you want to eat well or sleep well."

I wish you fruitful discussions over the next two days as you explore how to do both. Thank you.